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Abstract 
This study introduces ‘eco-sectarianism’, which is a new concept that explains the 
relationship between sectarian violence and environmental pressures in divided societies in 
the Middle East. Against the backdrop of climate change, ‘eco-sectarianism’ poses a 
challenge to many fragmented and unequal societies where the sense of national 
consciousness is weak and nation-building projects are incomplete. This paper draws 
attention to the links between politicisation of sub-national identities and emerging ecological 
challenges in Syria. 
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Introduction  
The relationship between the environment and armed conflict has been thoroughly studied in 
the past. Competition over productive or energy resources is widely accepted as a conflict 
trigger. In a similar vein, inequality between ethnically and religiously distinct groups has 
been linked to intra-state conflict over natural resources.
1
 Nonetheless, in terms of evaluating 
the Middle Eastern sectarian clashes, environmental pressures have not been granted 
sufficient research. Due to the global hunger for energy resources, the Middle East is often 
viewed as a battleground where international interests collide over demand for oil and gas. 
This over-fixation with energy resources seems to be receding. Climate change crystallises as 
a verity and not just a notional topic discussed at international conferences and chanted at 
environmental marches. Ecological pressures are already causing economic losses and social 
deterioration on a global scale and have been officially recognised as a security threat.
2
 
This study examines the relationship between ecology and sectarian violence. The authors 
argue that ecological issues can intensify the rise of militant sectarianism in the Middle East. 
In this light, we introduce the notion of ‘eco-sectarianism’ – a hybrid term which embodies 
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our conceptual framework. ‘Eco-sectarianism’ refers to politicisation of intra-religious 
binaries in fragmented ethno-religious societies where manmade or natural ecological 
problems such as famine and water scarcity regenerate sectarian narratives and deepen social 
division.       
Competing intra-religious beliefs is not the causal factor behind the escalation of sectarian 
violence. However, their polarising characteristics are utilised for group mobilisation to 
compete over vital resources. Such rivalry has a seemingly sectarian outlook, but in reality, 
this type of identity politics has been aggravated by complex social, political, economic and 
ecological problems. Divisive sectarian perspectives and their utilisation by conflict 
entrepreneurs portray these problems as the trans-historical religious divisions - an 
‘inevitable’ feature of every historical stage. Thus, sectarian narratives simplify the 
complexity of these socio-economic issues to serve group mobilisation.  
When the key components of sectarianism such as cultural tribalism, moral supremacism and 
the politics of victimhood are fused with resource scarcity caused by ecological problems, a 
fertile condition is created for the escalation of conflict in fragmented societies. The parallels 
between ecology and violence are already established in many societies in the world.
3
 
Nonetheless, ‘eco-sectarianism’ primarily emerges in religiously diverse societies where 
ecological problems are fused with unsuccessful nation-building projects.  In the absence of a 
strong national consciousness, pre-modern social identities are more likely to play a dominant 
role in mobilising social groups which are under increasing ecological pressure to secure vital 
resources.  
In the absence of formal trans-tribal, trans-regional, trans-sectarian pressure groups - and any 
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other effective institutions of civil society - religious identities  horizontally bind individuals 
together and frame their demands within a cohesive, simplistic and seemingly legitimate 
framework.  Vertical state institutions often lack legitimacy to provide an effective counter-
narrative. Therefore, horizontal social agencies have an upper hand in framing the situation, 
standardising the narratives and synchronizing them across the community.  Of course, 
ecological problems are not singlehandedly responsible for sectarian violence, but they can 
deteriorate the problem. 
The Middle East is arid or semi-arid and therefore is extremely vulnerable to climate 
change.
4
 Droughts are a common natural phenomenon in this region. However, the 1998-
2012 period is considered the driest one in the Levant since the sixteenth century.
5
 Droughts 
are predicted to reoccur with increased severity in the next decades because of climate 
change.
6
 A recent study reviewing water availability and climate change issued a prediction 
for the driest countries in the next few decades.
7
 According to the World Resource Institute, 
of the 33 countries that are expected to face extreme water stress by 2040, more than half are 
situated in the Middle East. Moreover, seven out of ten most water-stressed countries are in 
the Middle East.
8
 Access to water is a pressing challenge in the region and it will only be 
exacerbated by climate change. 
Middle Eastern governments have a long record of water mismanagement.
9
 The region’s 
natural resource governance has been a subject of long-standing criticism.
10
 The Tigris-
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Euphrates Basin has been rated the second fastest drying water basin in the world.
11
  The 
countries in the region host a constellation of sub-national groups formed by tribal, sectarian 
and linguistic similarities.
12
 These groups rarely share the spoils of political and economic 
power – in fact, most Middle Eastern countries are ridden by socio-economic inequalities.13 
Thus, adverse climate conditions, droughts in particular, will further exacerbate existing 
social tensions and create new challenges for countries with diverse ethno-sectarian 
populations. Climate change, combined with the socio-economic dynamics of inequality, will 
aid identity radicalisation in the shape of ‘eco-sectarianism’.  
This article aims to contribute to the existing debate about rise of sectarianism by introducing 
the new notion of ‘eco-sectarianism’ and applying it to the conflict in Syria. Our choice of 
case study stems from a number of factors. Firstly, Syria hosts a diverse population, whose 
Muslim majority subscribes to different Islamic sects. Secondly, the country has been 
severely affected by sectarian violence following the Arab Uprising. Most importantly, 
Syria’s large agricultural communities were acutely affected by drought, which implicitly 
influenced the public attitude towards the political status quo, and thus contributed to the 
instigation of protest movements which sparked the civil war.
14
.  
 
 
Methodology  
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This research adapts an inductive approach in order to generate a new perspective on 
sectarianism emerging from data. This research benefits from both primary and 
secondary data.  Given the security challenges and the heavy presence of IS in Al-Jazira 
province at the time of undertaking this research project, it was difficult to travel to Syria 
to conduct interviews in person. In this light six semi-structured interviews were 
conducted via Skype and other online communication tools in Arabic and then 
transcribed into English. Employing semi-structured interviews ensured a greater 
flexibility in terms of letting respondents develop their ideas and also allowing for more 
discussion. It also afforded the interviewees the opportunity to express their points in 
their own words.  The informants were approached through snowballing method. They 
are all, Arab, Sunni and males between the ages of 27 to 40. Although we actively tried to 
have a more representative sample, it was not possible to have a wider group of 
interviewees.  All informants are either farmers or closely connected to the farming 
community in Al-Jazira province.  They all connected to the rural communities in Al-
Bukamal in Deir ez-Zor, Al-Hasakah and Raqqa. We have primarily targeted this 
province because it has been badly affected by ecological and environmental problems 
prior to the start of the conflict. Our interviews were conducted when ISIS was still 
controlling most of the region. 
 
The safety and security of the interviewees was taken into consideration in all cases and 
accordingly in this article we use only their first names to protect their identity. Although 
these informants provide valuable insight into the issues central to this research project, the 
authors use a variety of sources to complement the interviews.  As well as engaging with the 
relevant interdisciplinary literature, this study benefits from a number of other primary 
sources in English and Arabic. The authors have gathered data from various policy papers 
and environmental reports put together by leading international organisations. We have 
undertaken this research project by building on professional reports and surveys from The 
World Resource Institute (WRI), The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), The United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the World Bank and United 
States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL).  
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Sectarianism, Inequality and Group Identity 
The politicisation of sub-national identities has a complex character. Perhaps the most 
notable account for the dynamics of modern identity was attempted by Charles Taylor.  He 
argues that personal identity is deeply intertwined with the social medium. Taylor stresses on 
the importance of intersubjectivity of self-referential value judgements and namely, how the 
individual perceives herself in relation to others
15. Another pivotal point in Taylor’s work are 
the socially constructed beliefs about the kind of life that is worth living. These are the beliefs 
informing choices in everyday life, also the aspirations towards the life deemed as ‘deserved’. 
The dignity of self and others depends on how social roles are understood. 
16
  
Taylor’s ideas resonate with Tajfel and Turner’s social identity theory.17 It mandates that 
individuals orient in the world by categorising self and others in groups. Categorisation is 
done by different criteria and the important feature of each group is that individuals define 
themselves as members and this membership is reinforced by the collective. These 
categorisations serve as clarification in two ways: internally, as reference points for the self, 
but also externally – to classify and arrange the social environment. As individuals naturally 
strive to maintain a positive self-evaluation, they attribute value and importance to the groups 
they belong to. A crucial point in social identification is inter-group comparison.
18
  
 
In the context of inequality, social identity is a guide to understanding one’s place in the 
social hierarchy.  
As far as the causes of sectarian radicalisation are concerned, relative deprivation theorists 
connect it to the inter-group comparison and marginalization. Identity escalation and social 
unrest have a complex dynamic relationship. Relative deprivation, a term popularized by Ted 
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Gurr in 1970 heralded a constellation of theories linking social perceptions of injustice with 
conflict and social identity radicalization. Relative deprivation is the perceived discrepancy 
between value expectations and value capabilities. In Taylor’s terms – the discrepancy 
between what is seen as deserved and what is actually received. Values are social goods - 
access to education and healthcare, economic opportunities, political representation, etc. A 
more recent refinement of the effects of inter-group comparison and deprivation originates 
from the works of Frances Stewart Stewart links conflict in ethnically diverse societies with 
relative deprivation experienced by culturally distinct groups, which she calls ‘horizontal 
inequalities’.19 
 
 Horizontal inequalities are social, economic and political inequalities between culturally 
distinct groups (while vertical inequalities occur between individuals). A crucial component 
in Stewart’s theory is the distinctiveness of the social groups – they can be characterized as 
ethnically, religiously and/or linguistically distinct groups. Hence, social identification is 
enabled by common identity markers. Stewart concludes that religion is a stronger mobilizing 
factor than ethnicity, as religious movements tend to tap into generous international support. 
20
 Thus local movements who tackle horizontal inequality increase the chances for any sort of 
foreign intervention.  
Horizontal inequalities occur when there are differences in the set of rights that social groups 
enjoy. Moreover, the dignity of a person and her respective collective is also undermined by 
such a discrepancy. This in turn triggers defence mechanisms, which enable the politicization 
of social identities.
21
 Stewart argues that equal access to education, economic assets and 
healthcare is the key to peace and sustainable development in religiously and ethnically 
diverse societies. 
22
 The comparison between social identity groups should not reveal 
discrepancies in capabilities. These discrepancies may occur in terms of political 
participation, economic assets, income levels and employment; and social aspects. Water as a 
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productive resource can be particularly important in agricultural areas with scarce rainfall.
23
  
 It is evident that when services are ill-distributed between ethno-sectarian groups, grievances 
against the state and the dominant ethnic group are easily generated.
24
 Stewart treats political 
representation as a social right that may become a subject of horizontal inequality.
25
 Stewart’s 
cogitations concept sends out a warning to the Middle East, as governments are traditionally 
dominated by one ethno-sectarian group.  The security apparatus in many Middle Eastern 
countries is constructed upon sectarian, ethnic, tribal and familial ties to the established 
regimes.
26
 Once the policing and the governance of a state are dominated by one ethno-
sectarian group, it is easier to exert control on social movements. Some regimes have been 
criticized for drawing upon sectarian identity when forming their security apparatus – by 
boosting it with predominantly Sunni recruits.
27
  Moreover, embracing a simplistic 
explanation for social unrest becomes more feasible - since the law and order are dictated by 
one group - the other disenfranchised group becomes targeted as a potential aggressor 
seeking retribution.
28
 
 
Eco-sectarianism 
The above theoretical perspectives present valid and compelling arguments but are not 
exhaustive in explaining the new wave of sectarian violence in the Middle East. In 
addition to that conventional explanations such as interstate rivalry, state sponsored 
propaganda, foreign intervention and the consequences of the Arab Spring are influential, 
but not exhaustive in explaining the current sectarian violence in the region. The authors 
believe a crucial determinant is largely under-researched, videlicet: the environment.  
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 The link between environmental problems and social conflict is well-established. ‘While 
the precise roles of the environment in peace, conflict, destabilisation and human 
insecurity may differ from situation to situation and as such are still being debated in 
relation to other security and conflict variables, there are growing indications that it is 
increasingly an underlying cause of instability, conflict and unrest’. 29 It is well 
established that ‘environmental security is central to national security, comprising the 
dynamics and interconnections among the natural resource base, the social fabric of the 
state, and the economic engine for local and regional stability’30  
Having said that ecological problems alone cannot spark sectarian conflicts. However, when 
destructive environmental problems are merged with other detrimental factors such as social 
fragmentation, incomplete nation building, uneven development and political 
maladministration, it can set the stage for both politicisation and securitisation of sectarian 
binaries. It is widely accepted that bad environmental conditions have an impact on 
intercommunal dynamics.
31
 It is also evident that a strong sense of national consciousness 
and social cohesion can reduce violent intercommunal rivalry. However, in fragmented 
nations, where there is a pervasive sense of mistrust towards the state, sub-state identities 
surface as lifebelts to fill the void created by the state.  As our case study in Syria suggest, 
pressing ecological problems strengthen the divisive sectarian narratives, emboldens the 
politics of ‘other-ing’ and fortify the socio-religious boundaries of desperate communities 
who unremittingly compete over fundamental resources and struggle for survival.  
The relationship between natural resources and conflict, particularly in the Middle East, 
evokes images of oil and gas. Energy resources and their extraction, export and territorial 
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specifics have been alleged triggers of inter and intrastate conflict alike. Nonetheless, 
environment and in particular water scarcity are equally potent, if not a more explosive, 
ingredient in conflict causation. As a source of livelihood, water is a crucially important 
resource. It has been argued that climate change and adverse weather conditions will bring a 
new set of wars that will be fought over bare necessities such as food and water.
32
  
In horizontally unequal societies social, economic and political rights are unfairly distributed 
in favour of the ruling elitist group.
33
 For example, with regard to hydro-politics, such 
maldistribution may include water mismanagement, excessive or lacking agrarian subsidies, 
sanitation, humanitarian aid etc. However, in areas with existing socio-religious divisions, 
ecological problems and water scarcity may aggravate intercommunal rivalry and shift the 
focus from environment to identity politics. Since inter-group comparison is crucial to social 
identification and to the collective sense of belonging, horizontal inequalities fortify sectarian 
divisions which are based on exclusionary binaries of ‘us’ versus’ them’. 
The lack of adequate state response to ecological crisis feeds the public perception of a 
natural disaster as a local plight instead of a national catastrophe. In such a political climate, 
peripheral ethnic or religious groups are vulnerable to the politics of victimisation. In this 
light, rather than being a consequence of a natural cause and effect chain, environmentally 
caused impoverishment is likely to be seen as deliberate. In a time of an ecological crisis the 
state which lacks legitimacy cannot play a sufficient role in managing the public perception. 
Although the ecological crisis may have been caused by factors beyond the power of the 
state, the ruling regime will be perceived as complicit in the problem. As our Syrian case 
study demonstrate, in a fragmented society where discrimination is prevalent, the people who 
are affected by the ecological problems are very likely to perceive their dire situation as the 
result of divisive and discriminatory policies of the state.  
While ecological catastrophes have economic and social consequences, they also act as push 
and pull factors. Scarcity triggers migration: large masses of people move in search of a new 
livelihood. That will create new chain of problems.  Internal displacement and urban 
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migration require an adequate governmental response, new services, integration and 
ultimately, a form of social security. Environmentally-induced displacement often results in 
an influx of people into town and city areas, creating a new urban poor class. This process 
aggravates the tension between haves and have-nots – given the existing social fragmentation 
and politically cemented ethno-sectarian inequality, the affected social groups are likely to 
evaluate their plights through the lenses of identity politics. In other words, they are likely to 
see themselves as the victims of discrimination rather than environmentally induced 
problems.    
‘Eco-sectarianism’ is a notion that ties the gulf between politicised socio-religious identities 
and the pressing ecological problems. ‘Eco-sectarianism’ is a political phenomenon occurring 
in divided societies, plagued by environmental catastrophes. Ecological pressures hold a great 
influence in regeneration of binary narratives in countries with incomplete process of nation 
building. ‘Eco-sectarianism’ poses a threat to segregated societies, as they are 
disproportionately vulnerable to shocks such as natural disasters and resource scarcity. At the 
time of a natural catastrophe, the lack of strong national consciousness and the alienation 
versus the favouritism of religiously distinct groups pave the way to fortification of sectarian 
identities.  
When the fundamental elements of sectarianism like cultural tribalism, moral supremacism 
and the politics of victimhood are fused with resource scarcity caused by ecological 
problems, a fertile ground is created for violent intercommunal rivalry in fragmented 
societies. Indeed, in divided societies, competition over vital productive resources 
exacerbates the polarising narratives. In this vein, natural resource scarcity and 
mismanagement are simplified as part of the battle between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Indeed, at the 
time of ecological disaster, this social polarisation becomes particularly compelling because it 
is simplified through exclusive binaries of ‘black’ versus ‘white’ or ‘Sunnites’ versus 
‘Shiʿites’. The sense of religious ‘righteousness’ not only creates powerful mobilisation 
dynamics but it also provides the sense of legitimacy to resort to violence.  
 
The societal fragmentation coupled with the incapacity of the states to deal with the 
 13 
consequences of natural disasters reinforces existing sectarian sentiments, a process 
especially perilous in horizontally unequal societies. Environmental pressures exacerbate 
already existing tensions and religious or sectarian justification of inter-group violence is 
extremely problematic as it is built upon the understanding of a ‘divine’ right to restore 
justice and, what is more, the duty to punish the ‘transgressors’ 
 
‘Eco-sectarianism’ thrives in divided and insecure societies where national identity is still too 
fragmented. In these divided societies, nation-building projects have not been able to create 
cohesive national narratives, which could constitute organic bridges between various sects 
and ethnicities. In societies where national consciousness is weak, sectarian identities are 
often prone to politicisation because these pre-modern identities have not been effectively 
accommodated within the framework of modern nation-state. Hence, they still have powerful 
mobilising properties, because sectarian identities still carry their pre-nation-state socio-
political significance. Various products of modernity such as nation-state could not create a 
neutral social sphere where people from various backgrounds could horizontally constitute 
united fronts to negotiate or even challenge the state. 
 
Case vignette: Eco-sectarianism in Syria: 
The Syrian civil war is a highly complex conflict which is not born in a socio-political 
vacuum. There were many influential factors which contributed to the escalation of violence. 
Although much attention has been given to both the reginal and political variables, the 
ecological issues have been largely overlooked. We suggest that the ecological problems and 
the ways in which they were perceived by various social groups also have contributed to the 
escalation of violence.     
 
The environmental pressures that plagued the country right before the uprising play an 
important, albeit overlooked role in the escalation of the Syrian conflict which had a sectarian 
overtone. The period 2004-2010 was marked by the most devastating drought in recent 
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Middle Eastern history.
34
 Drought is by no means a novelty in the area, but the severity and 
reoccurrence of it, however, has been unprecedented.
35
 Reports suggest that this might have 
been the worst drought since the dawn of agricultural civilizations in the Fertile Crescent.
36
  
Roughly three million inhabitants of the eastern Syrian provinces were affected by it, most of 
them being Sunnis. By 2009 over 800,000 people had lost their livelihoods and were faced 
with extreme hardship.
37
  
After the start of the drought, the Syrian government made a series of unsustainable 
decisions. Absolving responsibility for the plight of farmers was but just one of their 
miscalculations. Attracted by the high prices of wheat in 2006, the government sold its 
strategic reserves. Consequently, it was unable to provide adequate relief to the deprived 
agricultural areas. The government let go of its responsibility for water mismanagement and 
placed the blame on environmental pressures
38
. As one of the interviewees affirmed: 
The government kept blaming the global warming while we are aware that a 
great part of the problem was created because of its agricultural policies. 
Subsidies to peasants were cancelled and investment was channelled into other 
sectors.
39
 
 
Indeed, the government’s reluctance to deal with the pressing crisis aggravated the feeling of 
inequality and generated narratives of victimhood among the Sunnis. In the past, there had 
been a frost affecting Alawite communities, which according to many Sunni farmers was 
swiftly addressed by the government. Many Sunni farming communities believe that their 
Alawite counterparts received support and compensation from the state while the Sunni 
communities were neglected. One of our interviewees Abdulrahman said: 
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I believe that the government has fairly contributed to all people’s 
impoverishment including the rural areas of its own sect (Alawite), but people in 
my region of eastern Syria usually underline the way how their problem of 
drought was treated comparing to the treatment of the Alawites’ problem of frost. 
We remember that officials in Latakia and Tartus have offered a financial 
indemnity for the Alawites’ damaged farms which is something did not happen in 
Deir Al-Zour east of Syria. The environmental specifics of different regions 
played decisive role here. Alawite areas are naturally rainy, while our areas have 
been suffering from drought and other ecological problems for many years. 
Nonetheless, the government responded positively to the Alawite case of frost in 
the coast and ignored every case in our Sunni region. Besides, the brutal response 
of the Alawi dominated regime to the revolution has added extra credit to these 
grievances, the thing that made the sectarian narrative regarding the agricultural 
management even falsely reasonable.  
40
 
 
  Another interviewee, Majid from Al-Hasakah, said: 
The [Sunni] community in Al-Jazeera region has felt marginalised for a long time. 
Other sects get richer at our expense.
41
 
  
These statements are perfect examples of politicisation of sectarian identity at a time of 
environmental problems. They show the ways in which the sense of mistrust towards the state 
can politicise intercommunal relations in a fragmented society where there is weak sense of  
national consciousness.  Framing and evaluating the situation through the lenses of identity 
politics is evident here because the Alawites areas - Latakia, Tartus, Baniyas and Jableh - 
were also affected by the drought and neglected by the government.
42
 For instance, in Latakia 
and Jableh, as local produce growers were in need of irrigation water, they turned to using 
rainwater and river water. These alternative water sources were contaminated, causing 
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numerous incidences of food poisoning.
43
 The Assad government did not respond to the food 
poisoning and water scarcity in Alawite areas in any way. However, Sunni farmers still 
believed to be relatively deprived in comparison to Alawite farmers. As Lukman sees it: 
High levels of corruption and nepotism were affecting the state’s policies in many 
sectors – agriculture was not an exception. Many decision makers and 
government officials originate from the Alawite rural community. Thus they have 
managed to give more opportunities to their own community. It is common 
knowledge that the Alawites are ruling the country and they have never been fair 
to other sects and ethnicities. As far as I know, less than ten percent of people in 
Latakia are working in the agricultural sector. Nonetheless, the government was 
very keen to establish many projects to plant, promote and distribute the citrus 
fruits grown there. They helped the Latakian farmers export their products to the 
Gulf states, Europe and Egypt. The same assistance was requested here [in Deir 
ez-Zor, a Sunni majority area] but we did not receive anything. 
44
  
  
Among the victims of the drought, small scale and subsistence farmers suffered worst. It has 
been estimated that between 2007 and 2010 herders in eastern Syria lost 80% of their 
livestock.
45
The drought triggered a wave of migration. Impoverished farmers, mostly Sunni, 
became environmental refugees, forced to abandon their homes and to settle into urban 
centres. 
 Migration statistics reveal that between 40,000 to 60,000 families sold their belongings and 
moved to cities.
46
 The government set up temporary camps, however failing to provide good 
services for the displaced. Evidently, the ‘cradle of the revolution’ – the city of Dara’a was 
one of the urban centres that received numerous refugees. Moreover, there was already a 
strain on public services for the recently arrived 1.5 million Iraqi refugees.
47
 The 
government’s failure to address the pressing humanitarian crisis added to public dissent. 
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Its clear, the environmental and climatic changes that plagued Syria eroded the already weak 
state-society relations. The economic difficulties that the population experienced were in 
stark contrast with the lavish life of the government-associated elite. While not all of its 
members belong to the Alawite sect, it was easy for sectarian binary narratives to thrive. This 
is not to say all rebel groups in Syria are driven by sectarianism. Many cities, caught in the 
middle between militias and the army, rely on secular local formations of various 
backgrounds to ensure the local security.
48
 Having said that, there is still strikingly high 
number of militia groups with clear sectarian outlook. Despite the recent public obsession 
with the Islamic State, it is but one of the dozens of armed militias with sectarian tendencies 
crusading the country. One can exemplify both Ahrar al-Sham and Fateh al-Sham as other 
important militia organisations with sectarian agenda. Evidence from 2013 suggests that there 
are around 1,000 Sunni rebel groups that deploy about 100,000 fighters.
49
  
 
In addition, Syrian soil is trumped by tens of international Shiʿite militias, emerging mainly 
from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah. Since 2012 there has 
been an influx of Shiʿite militias coming to the aid of the government.50 Indigenous groups 
form a small part of these militias, while the majority - roughly 40,000 people - is drawn 
primarily from Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
51
 Iranian backed 
Shiʿite militias step in to protect their holy sites and to assert the regime’s positions. For most 
of the Sunni militia groups, success on the ground is unattainable without the support of the 
local Syrian population. Although they recruit foreign fighters, they heavily relay on the 
indigenous population for their activities. In this light, impoverished Sunni farmers become 
easy prey for the militias – financial incentives. The recruitment of the penurious Sunni 
farmers becomes easier when they witness the military force Al-Assad willingly uses on 
civilians. 
                                                          
48
 VICE news, Rojava: Syria’s Unknown War, online multimedia, 2 January 2014 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2zxlFQxkQ4 (accessed 11 March 2016). 
49
 BBC News, ‘Guide to the Syrian Rebels’, news release December 2013. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24403003 (accessed 17 February 2016). 
50
Phillip Smyth, ‘The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects’, Policy Focus 138(Washington 
DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
2015).http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138-v3.pdf 
(accessed17 February 2016). 
51
Arosoaie, ‘Shi’ite Militias in Syria’. 
 18 
In the case of Syria, water as a productive resource is vital to the livelihood of a quarter of its 
population, which consists of mainly Sunni farmers.
52
 The loss of income and the mass urban 
migration contributed to the perception of horizontal inequality. As was discussed before, 
horizontal inequality represents unequal distribution of social rights between culturally 
distinct groups.
53
 Sectarianism is fuelled by the perception that the government is controlled 
by the Alawite, while Sunnis are pushed to the margins. The mostly Sunni environmental 
refugees then generate dissent against the Alawite-dominated government. While the dissent 
is political, the grave socio-economic state of Sunni farmers fosters the loathing of the 
Alawite sect as a usurper and oppressor. The sense of sectarian victimisation transpired in the 
responses of our interviewees. Imad, a young farmer from rural Raqqa affirmed: 
People in Alawite rural community have many agricultural projects and they 
easily export their agricultural products. By contrast, people in my region were 
not assisted and encouraged to export their harvests, despite the necessity of doing 
so. Another example is the giant dome vegetable farms: Alawite farmers were 
allowed to create them in addition to being generously compensated for any 
damage in their harvests. At the same time, giant dome farms were banned in the 
Sunni Al-Jazeera region. They will put you in prison if you just think about 
starting one.
54
  
 
In such divisive socio-political environment, jihadi recruiters appear to be presenting a ticket 
out of poverty and a route to political change, glorified by a sectarian discourse. Local 
fighters join not only because of financial incentives and ideological zeal, but also for 
political reasons. The humanitarian crisis that caused by drought aggravated dormant 
grievances. The feeling of abandonment and powerlessness, and of being betrayed by the 
government easily transforms into hatred and vindictiveness.  
 
What is more, it makes it easier to differentiate between the group and the ruling elite 
drawing on sectarian differences. Therefore, ‘eco-sectarianism’ became one of the important 
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drivers of the Syrian conflict: the devastating drought that impoverished and displaced 
thousands of families contributed to both politicisation and securitisation of sub-state and 
supra-state identities which continued to break down the fabric of Syrian national 
consciousness. From the interviews we have conducted, it became apparent that after the start 
of the war, the Sunni identity started to matter more than during peaceful times. One of the 
interviewees, Mohammed – a middle-aged farmer from Al-Bukamal shared his feelings with 
us: 
we, the Sunnis, were targeted by this fascist regime which showed its hatred to us 
in a very critical moment.
55
 
 
We observed the trend of victimhood in the responses of other interviewees, two of them – 
Imad and Ahmad even went as far as suggesting transnational persecution of the Sunni 
people. Ahmad stated that: 
The fact that I am Sunni is more important to me than it was before the war. I do 
feel that today we are intentionally targeted.
56
I am not committed to any ethnic or 
sectarian identity, but at the same time I cannot doubt that Sunnis in Syria and 
Iraq were systematically targeted and displaced.
57
 
 
 As environmental forecasts bode reoccurring droughts and water shortages, the risk of eco-
sectarianism is escalating. The threat of water scarcity and sectarian narratives was a common 
realisation expressed by our interviewees: 
When it comes to my local community, I am afraid that water shortage will 
continue to be one of the main threats. If we say in the short term, I think the 
struggle over natural resources will be inevitable. 
58
 Water shortage, Illiteracy, 
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long term bitterness between local communities and the struggle over natural 
resources are the biggest long-term threats for my community.
59
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
The new wave of sectarianism in Syria is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon and 
cannot be attributed to a single cause. The current debate regarding sectarianism hinges on its 
political drivers – regional contestation, external intervention, horizontal inequalities and 
social exclusion, protest movements and their crackdown. The importance of these factors is 
undeniable in escalation of conflicts in places such as Syria. However, it is also important to 
accept the significance of ecological factors in the process of sectarian radicalisation. 
Although this study was not necessarily in search of the casual factor behind emerging 
sectarian tensions, it attempted to broaden the existing understanding of this multifaceted 
phenomenon. By elucidating the inductive concept of ‘eco-sectarianism’, the authors have 
portrayed the relationship between sectarian radicalisation and the emerging ecological 
pressures. Although the link between ecological problems and social conflict is well-
established, we acknowledge that ecological problems alone cannot trigger sectarian 
conflicts. However, when destructive ecological problems are fused with other detrimental 
factors such as social fragmentation, incomplete nation building, uneven development and 
political mismanagement can set the stage for both politicisation and securitisation of 
sectarian binaries.  
Indeed, pressing environmental conditions have an impact on intercommunal dynamics. 
When there are extreme ecological and environmental pressures, a strong sense of national 
consciousness can minimise intercommunal rivalry over vital resources. However, in 
fragmented nations, where the authorities are mistrusted, sub-state identities surface as 
lifebelts to fill the void created by the state. The pressing ecological problems strengthen the 
divisive sectarian narratives, vitalises the politics of ‘other-ing’ and reinforce the socio-
religious boundaries of desperate communities who assiduously compete over vital resources 
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and struggle for survival.  
In the absence of strong trans-tribal and trans-sectarian pressure groups - and any other 
effective institutions of civil society –  ethnic or sectarian identities horizontally bind 
individuals together and frame their demands within a one-dimensional and seemingly 
legitimate framework.  Vertical state institutions often lack legitimacy to provide an effective 
counter-narrative. Sectarian narratives reframe the struggle and shift the focus from 
environmental problems to the historic battle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. This sense of 
religious rectitude not only creates powerful mobilisation dynamics but it also provides the 
sense of ‘rightfulness’ to resort to violence.         
It is crucially important to recognise the importance of political representation in diverse and 
fragmented societies. In the case of Syria, the official power was perceived as monopolised 
by one group at the expense of others. The feeling of victimhood and misrepresentation of 
ethno-sectarian groups fuelled social polarisation. In the case of devastating ecological crisis, 
social polarisation coupled with deep-rooted political issues paved the way to further social 
fragmentation and group mobilisation in order to compete over recourses. 
The recent drought in the Middle East has had detrimental social effects and climate scientists 
suggest it merely marked the beginning of a cycle of reoccurring prolonged droughts. 
Numerous climate change studies warn that in the next decades the Middle East will face 
increasingly bad water shortages. Because of the demographic, historical, economic and 
political features of the Middle East, these grim predictions can give foreboding for a new era 
of ‘eco-sectarian’ conflicts. 
 
*** 
